261  * @new: The proposed new credentials; alterations should be made here
263  * @effective: A pointer to the proposed new effective capabilities set
264  * @inheritable: A pointer to the proposed new inheritable capabilities set
265  * @permitted: A pointer to the proposed new permitted capabilities set
268  * process's capability sets.  The changes are made to the proposed new
271 int cap_capset(struct cred *new,  in cap_capset()  argument
287 		/* no new pI capabilities outside bounding set */  in cap_capset()
290 	/* verify restrictions on target's new Permitted set */  in cap_capset()
298 	new->cap_effective   = *effective;  in cap_capset()
299 	new->cap_inheritable = *inheritable;  in cap_capset()
300 	new->cap_permitted   = *permitted;  in cap_capset()
306 	new->cap_ambient = cap_intersect(new->cap_ambient,  in cap_capset()
309 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))  in cap_capset()
556  * Return: On success, return the new size; on error, return < 0.
612  * Calculate the new process capability sets from the capability sets attached
620 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()  local
633 	new->cap_permitted.val =  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
634 		(new->cap_bset.val & caps->permitted.val) |  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
635 		(new->cap_inheritable.val & caps->inheritable.val);  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
637 	if (caps->permitted.val & ~new->cap_permitted.val)  in bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps()
821 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;  in handle_privileged_root()  local
830 	if (has_fcap && __is_suid(root_uid, new)) {  in handle_privileged_root()
839 	if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) {  in handle_privileged_root()
841 		new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset,  in handle_privileged_root()
847 	if (__is_eff(root_uid, new))  in handle_privileged_root()
858 static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)  in __is_setuid()  argument
859 { return !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid); }  in __is_setuid()
861 static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)  in __is_setgid()  argument
862 { return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); }  in __is_setgid()
881 static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,  in nonroot_raised_pE()  argument
886 	if ((__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
887 	     !(__cap_full(effective, new) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
888 	       (__is_eff(root, new) || __is_real(root, new)) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
891 	     __is_suid(root, new) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
892 	     !__cap_full(effective, new)) ||  in nonroot_raised_pE()
893 	    (!__is_setuid(new, old) &&  in nonroot_raised_pE()
895 	       __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) ||  in nonroot_raised_pE()
896 	      __cap_gained(ambient, new, old))))  in nonroot_raised_pE()
908  * Set up the proposed credentials for a new execution context being
918 	struct cred *new = bprm->cred;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()  local
930 	root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
935 	if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old))  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
941 	 * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs.  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
943 	is_setid = __is_setuid(new, old) || __is_setgid(new, old);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
945 	if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) &&  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
947 	     !ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) {  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
949 		if (!ns_capable(new->user_ns, CAP_SETUID) ||  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
951 			new->euid = new->uid;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
952 			new->egid = new->gid;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
954 		new->cap_permitted = cap_intersect(new->cap_permitted,  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
958 	new->suid = new->fsuid = new->euid;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
959 	new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
963 		cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
969 	new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
976 		new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
978 		new->cap_effective = new->cap_ambient;  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
980 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
983 	if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, old, root_uid, has_fcap)) {  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
984 		ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
989 	new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
991 	if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new)))  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
996 	    (!__is_real(root_uid, new) &&  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
998 	      __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new))))  in cap_bprm_creds_from_file()
1103  * cevans - New behaviour, Oct '99
1113 static inline void cap_emulate_setxuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)  in cap_emulate_setxuid()  argument
1120 	    (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) &&  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1121 	     !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) &&  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1122 	     !uid_eq(new->suid, root_uid))) {  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1124 			cap_clear(new->cap_permitted);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1125 			cap_clear(new->cap_effective);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1133 		cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1135 	if (uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1136 		cap_clear(new->cap_effective);  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1137 	if (!uid_eq(old->euid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid))  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1138 		new->cap_effective = new->cap_permitted;  in cap_emulate_setxuid()
1143  * @new: The proposed credentials
1152 int cap_task_fix_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, int flags)  in cap_task_fix_setuid()  argument
1161 			cap_emulate_setxuid(new, old);  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1173 			if (uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && !uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1174 				new->cap_effective =  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1175 					cap_drop_fs_set(new->cap_effective);  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1177 			if (!uid_eq(old->fsuid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->fsuid, root_uid))  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1178 				new->cap_effective =  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1179 					cap_raise_fs_set(new->cap_effective,  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1180 							 new->cap_permitted);  in cap_task_fix_setuid()
1265 	struct cred *new;  in cap_prctl_drop()  local
1272 	new = prepare_creds();  in cap_prctl_drop()
1273 	if (!new)  in cap_prctl_drop()
1275 	cap_lower(new->cap_bset, cap);  in cap_prctl_drop()
1276 	return commit_creds(new);  in cap_prctl_drop()
1298 	struct cred *new;  in cap_task_prctl()  local
1365 		new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1366 		if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1368 		new->securebits = arg2;  in cap_task_prctl()
1369 		return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1383 		new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1384 		if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1387 			new->securebits |= issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);  in cap_task_prctl()
1389 			new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS);  in cap_task_prctl()
1390 		return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1397 			new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1398 			if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1400 			cap_clear(new->cap_ambient);  in cap_task_prctl()
1401 			return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1420 			new = prepare_creds();  in cap_task_prctl()
1421 			if (!new)  in cap_task_prctl()
1424 				cap_raise(new->cap_ambient, arg3);  in cap_task_prctl()
1426 				cap_lower(new->cap_ambient, arg3);  in cap_task_prctl()
1427 			return commit_creds(new);  in cap_task_prctl()
1437  * cap_vm_enough_memory - Determine whether a new virtual mapping is permitted
1438  * @mm: The VM space in which the new mapping is to be made
1441  * Determine whether the allocation of a new virtual mapping by the current